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Abstract 
The tenure of Japanese prime ministers is famously short. Between 2006 and 2012 Japan changed prime minister once 
a year. What factors can explain Japan’s revolving-door premiership? To explore this puzzle, this article applies the 
Leadership Capital Index (LCI) developed by Bennister, ’t Hart and Worthy (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese 
prime ministers holding office between 2000 and 2015. Leadership capital is the aggregate of leaders’ political re-
sources: skills, relations and reputation. The LCI thus allows analysis of the interplay between individual capacities and 
contextual conditions in determining leaders’ ability to gain, maintain and deploy power. The LCI is applied to answer 
two questions. Firstly, what accounts for the short tenure of many Japanese premiers? In which of the LCI’s three lead-
ership dimensions do Japanese leaders lack capital? Secondly, what forms of capital allow some prime ministers to re-
tain office for longer than average (>2 years)? In particular, the article analyses the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi 
(2001–2006) Japan’s longest serving prime minister since the 1970s, and incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who 
has held office for three years since December 2012. As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the tenure of 
Japan’s prime ministers, this article tests the applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary democracies. 
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1. Introduction 
The turnover in holders of Japan’s highest office is fa-
mously rapid. From 2006 to 2012, six prime ministers 
served Japan in as many years. Japan’s revolving door 
premiership has been attributed to the weak capacity 
of the prime minister’s office. But what then accounts 
for the relatively long tenure and predominant leader-
ship of premiers such as Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) 
and Shinzo Abe (2012–)?  
To explore the varied fortunes of Japan’s leaders, 
this article applies the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) 
developed by Bennister et al. (2015) to case studies of 
the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office be-
tween 2000 and 2015.1 Leadership capital is defined as 
aggregate authority, composed of three dimensions: a 
leader’s skills, relations and reputation. The LCI pro-
vides a tool for systematically comparing leaders across 
these three broad areas that combines quantitative 
and qualitative elements. It thus allows more nuanced 
analysis than models relying on a single methodological 
approach by capturing the interplay between individual 
capacities and contextual conditions in determining 
leaders’ ability to act (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 417).  
Bennister et al. employ an analogy between capital 
and authority to illustrate the difference between mere 
office holding and exercising political leadership. Politi-
                                                          
1 Shinzo Abe’s two premierships (2006–2007 and 2012–) are 
accounted separately throughout the article. 
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cal authority is analogous to financial capital in that 
some leaders have it, while others do not. Like capital, 
authority can be saved, spent purposefully or frittered 
away. Office holding concerns gathering and conserv-
ing leadership capital, while leading requires spending 
it wisely and replenishing one’s stock. Exercising lead-
ership entails keeping stakeholders invested while 
tackling difficult and complex problems (Burns, 2003, p. 
20; Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009, p. 4).  
This article uses the LCI to systematically compare 
the authority of Japan’s prime ministers in order to an-
swer two questions. Firstly, does a broader lack of lead-
ership capital, rather than mere institutional weakness, 
account for the short tenure of many Japanese prem-
iers? If so, in which of the three leadership dimensions 
composing the LCI do Japanese leaders have low stocks? 
Do different Japanese prime ministers suffer from the 
same type of leadership deficit? Secondly, what forms of 
capital allow some Japanese prime ministers to retain 
office for longer than average (>2 years)? What factors 
allowed Junichiro Koizumi to become Japan’s second 
longest serving prime minister under the 1947 Constitu-
tion? Why is incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on 
his way to beating Koizumi’s record, despite the fact that 
his first premiership ended ignobly after just one year? 
As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the 
authority of Japan’s prime ministers, this article tests the 
applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary 
democracies. I conclude that with minor adaptations to 
account for bureaucratic, factional and one-party domi-
nant nature of Japanese politics, the LCI is a useful tool 
for robust analysis of political leadership in Japan.  
In the sections that follow, I first examine existing 
scholarship on prime ministerial leadership in Japan. I 
then discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the con-
cept of ‘leadership capital’, before presenting its three 
main forms (skills, relations and reputation capital). 
Next I introduce the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) and 
apply it to my nine prime ministerial subjects. I con-
clude by summarising my answers to the two research 
questions outlined above and discussing further devel-
opment of the LCI. 
2. Leadership and the Authority of the Japanese Prime 
Minister 
Under the 1947 constitution, 32 prime ministers have 
held office in Japan, among whom only five have spent 
four or more years in office. Owing to their short tenure, 
for most of the post-war period, Japanese prime minis-
ters were considered institutionally weak (Shinoda, 
2011, p. 48). Until the 2000s, the policy-making role of 
the Japanese prime minister was largely overlooked, 
with attention instead focusing on Japan’s powerful bu-
reaucracy and factional politics within the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) (Krauss & Nyblade, 2005, p. 
357). Aurelia George Mulgan used the term ‘un-
Westminster’ system to describe Japan’s policy-process: 
“The [Japanese] system does not produce strong 
cabinet government with a prominent leadership 
role played by the prime minister, but a dual power 
structure of party-bureaucracy policy-making in 
which the prime minister and cabinet play a subordi-
nate, rather than a superordinate role.” (2003, p. 84) 
The unusually long premiership of charismatic Junichiro 
Koizumi from April 2001 to September 2006, however, 
led to a reassessment of prime ministerial authority 
(Machidori, 2006). Yet after raising expectations that 
his five immediate successors could not fulfil, Koizumi’s 
strong leadership was recognised as an exception ra-
ther than the new norm (Mishima, 2012; Shimizu, 
2005; Uchiyama, 2010). Shinzo Abe’s dominance since 
returning to the premiership for a second non-
consecutive term in December 2012, however, sug-
gests that Koizumi’s strong leadership was not unique 
and that the leadership capacity of Japan’s highest of-
fice should be reconsidered (Burrett, forthcoming). 
An increased potential for prime ministerial leader-
ship within the Japanese government from the 1990s is 
attributed to changes in political communications, 
electoral reforms and/or a greater concentration of re-
sources in the prime minister’s office (Kabashima & 
Steel, 2012; Krauss, 2000; Krauss & Nyblade, 2005; 
Otake, 2006). Changes in the relationship between pol-
itics and the media in Japan have led to a greater focus 
on the prime minister (Krauss, 2000). Japanese prime 
ministers such as Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe 
successfully exploited new media dynamics to advance 
their personalised political agendas (Burrett, forthcom-
ing). Changes in political communications allow leaders 
to circumvent their parties and appeal directly to vot-
ers, a process enhanced by electoral reforms intro-
duced in 1994. 
Under Japan’s multi-member-district postwar elec-
toral system, large parties were forced to run more 
than one candidate per constituency, producing incen-
tives for intraparty factionalism. Each voter would cast 
just one ballot, but in a district that would send on av-
erage three-to-five members to the House of Repre-
sentatives, the lower house of Japan’s bicameral par-
liament. Any party seeking to win two or more seats in 
a district would have to nominate multiple candidates. 
Intraparty factions helped to oil the wheels of a system 
of parallel party machines by providing patronage and 
financial support to different candidates within the 
same district (McCall, Rosenbluth, & Thies, 2010, 2010, 
pp. 55-56). The institutionalizing of factions within the 
LDP, that ruled Japan from 1955 to 1993, constrained 
the policy- and appointment-making powers of the 
party leader. To win the LDP presidency, and thus nom-
ination to the post of prime minister, required a large 
factional power base. Changes introduced to the Japa-
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nese electoral system in the wake of the LDP’s defeat 
in 1993 general election were designed to weaken fac-
tions’ influence over both district election campaigns 
and national leader selection. The lower house elec-
toral system was altered from a multi-member-district, 
Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, to a com-
bination of 300 single-member-districts and 11 propor-
tional representation (PR) constituencies (180 seats). 
Under the new electoral system—used for the first 
time in 1996—political competition takes place along 
party lines (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2004). As a conse-
quence, factions have lost control of the LDP leader-
ship selection process, giving the prime minister poten-
tially greater freedom over policy-making and cabinet 
appointments (McCall et al., 2010, p. 110). 
Changes to the Japanese electoral system not only 
altered how the LDP selects its leaders, but also reor-
dered the wider party system (Schoppa, 2011). Un-
doubtedly, developments in the party system have had 
important consequences for the power and agency of 
the Japanese prime minister, not least in eventually 
bringing to office three premiers from the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ). The PR element of the new elec-
toral system has further encouraged fragmentation in a 
party system already prone to splits, mergers and de-
fections. Colleagues with personal, policy or political 
grudges against the prime minister are easily tempted 
to jump ship, knowing that the PR ballot will act as a 
lifesaver to any new party that can attract a few per 
cent at the polls. The prevalence of personality politics 
in Japan—initially encouraged by the multi-member-
district system—further exacerbates fragmentation, 
and along with the PR ballot, serves to entice populist 
mavericks to establish their own political parties. Splits 
and defections ordinarily reduce confidence in the 
prime minister, undermining his leverage with what 
remains of his party. Electoral reforms have thus been 
a double-edged sword for the authority of the Japa-
nese prime minister over his own party. 
The potential authority of Japan’s prime minister 
relative to that of other political actors has also been 
strengthened by a series of administrative innovations 
from the late 1990s that have shifted the locus of poli-
cy-making from Japan’s powerful ministries to the cab-
inet office. To reinforce the authority of the prime min-
ister and the cabinet, in 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto formed the Administrative Reform Council. 
The reforms subsequently passed by the Diet in July 
1999 enacted significant institutional changes to 
strengthen the power and function of the cabinet sec-
retariat—the prime minister’s support staff, equivalent 
to the British prime minister’s office (Shinoda, 2005, 
pp. 800-801). During his premiership from 2001 to 
2006, Junichiro Koizumi introduced further reforms 
aimed at strengthening the policy-making power of the 
prime minister vis-à-vis Japan’s bureaucracy (Mishima, 
2007, p. 727). From 2009 to 2012, the DPJ government 
added its own reforms of bureaucratic power. Margari-
ta Estévez-Abe argues that institutional changes in Ja-
pan over the past two decades have cast the die in fa-
vour of a Westminster system that centralizes power in 
the hands of the party leadership and prime minister, 
leading to ‘the Britannicization of Japan’ (2006, p. 633).  
Yet in Britain, between 2000 and 2015, only three 
prime ministers held office, compared to three times 
that number in Japan. Despite developments enhanc-
ing the potential authority of the Japanese prime min-
ister since the 1990s, few incumbents manage to main-
tain power for long. What light can the concept of 
‘leadership capital’, explained below, shine on the 
weak authority and subsequent short tenure of many 
Japanese prime ministers? 
3. Leadership Capital 
In their original article, Bennister et al. draw on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conceptualising of varieties of capital (eco-
nomic, cultural, social, political) in constructing their 
theory of leadership capital (2015, pp. 418-419). For 
Bourdieu, political capital is largely symbolic. It is the 
process by which ‘agents confer on a person…the very 
powers they recognise in him’, giving that person credit 
to ‘impose beliefs’ and ‘recognised principles’ (in Ben-
nister et al., 2015, p. 418). John Thompson similarly 
conceptualises political capital as a form of symbolic 
power that imbues its holder with ‘the capacity to in-
tervene in events, to influence the actions and beliefs 
of others and indeed to create events, by means of the 
production and transmission of symbolic forms’ (2000, 
p. 98). In exercising symbolic power, leaders draw on 
various kinds of resources, including their reputation, 
popularity and accumulated prestige, assets that 
Thompson terms their symbolic capital (Thompson, 
2000). Thompson argues that the use of symbolic pow-
er is not incidental or secondary to the struggle for po-
litical power, but essential to it: 
“Anyone who wishes to acquire political power or 
to exercise it in a durable and effective fashion 
must also use symbolic power to secure the support 
of others within the political sub-field and within 
the broader political field.” (2000, p. 102) 
Bourdieu and Thompson’s theorising enables the iden-
tification of three elements of political power that are 
central to Bennister et al.’s concept of leadership capi-
tal and to the categories composing the LCI that they 
develop to operationalise this concept (Figure 1). 
Firstly, leaders must have the personal political 
skills to gain and maintain political power (Bourdieu, 
2005, p. 39; King, 1991, p. 42). Leaders’ personalities 
and styles matter to the outcome of the policy process. 
Harold Lasswell (1936) pioneered the use of leadership 
typologies to understand the relationship between 
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personality and leaders’ performance. James Barber 
(1972) and Richard Neustadt (1991) offer typologies of 
presidential leadership in the United States. Also focus-
ing on the U.S., Fred Greenstein (2001) provides a six-
point framework for evaluating leaders’ political and 
personal skills based on: (1) proficiency as a communica-
tor (2) organisational capacity (3) political skills (4) policy 
vision (5) cognitive style and (6) emotional intelligence. 
 
Figure 1. Components of Leadership Capital. Source: 
Bennister et al. (2015, p. 422). 
Second, political power is relational. Bourdieu saw po-
litical power as derived from public trust granting a 
leader the capacity to mobilise supporters (In Bennister 
et al., 2015, p. 419). Leadership is an interaction be-
tween individuals, rather than action by one individual. 
As Robert Tucker writes, ‘Leadership is a process of 
human interaction in which some individuals exert or 
attempt to exert, a determining influence on others’ 
(1981, p. 11). James MacGregor Burns’ definition of 
leadership similarly focuses on the interaction between 
leaders and their followers: 
“Leadership over human beings is exercised when 
persons with certain motives and purposes mobi-
lise, in competition or conflict with others, institu-
tional, political, psychological, and other resources 
so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of 
followers.” (1978, p. 18) 
Relational Capital (R1) thus refers to the loyalties leaders 
mobilise, not only among voters but also among party 
colleagues, the media, business elites, bureaucrats and 
others possessing their own forms of capital that shape 
the leadership environment (Figure 1). Why people fol-
low, or at a minimum accept a leader, shapes the nature 
of leadership authority. Burns argues that interaction 
between leaders and their followers takes two funda-
mentally different forms. The first form Burns calls 
transactional leadership (1978, p. 19). The transactional 
leader interacts with followers for the purpose of ex-
change. The exchange can be economic or political: the 
trading of votes between candidate and citizen, or the 
swapping of goods. The purposes of each party are re-
lated, at least to the extent that each party stands to 
gain from the exchange. Beyond this exchange, howev-
er, the parties have no wider purpose holding them to-
gether. Transactional leaders accumulate capital through 
technical competence and ‘bringing home the bacon’, 
rather than through a mobilising narrative. Burns calls 
the second form of interaction between leaders and fol-
lowers transforming leadership (1978, p. 20). The trans-
forming leader interacts with followers in a way that 
changes them both. For Burns, transforming leadership 
is inspirational leadership that gathers capital by mobilis-
ing followers behind a particular vision or set of ideals.  
Essential to leader-follower relations are followers’ 
perceptions of a leader’s skills. In the LCI, leaders’ Skills 
Capital is separated into ‘soft’ (S1) and ‘hard’ (S2) skills. 
Hard skills are instrumental and transactional, while soft 
skills concern inspiration, persuasion and shaping the 
preferences of others (Nye, 2008). Perceptions of a 
leader’s skills also relate to his or her Reputational Capi-
tal (R2). A leader’s reputation is determined by their 
own behaviour and its observable impact, but also 
through interpretation of their behaviour by followers, 
colleagues, critics and other observers (Greenstein, 
2000, p. 182). By spending political capital, leaders can 
reinforce, alter or destroy their reputation, with im-
portant consequences for their future authority (Dahl, 
1961, p. 229). Leadership capital increases when a lead-
er’s reputation meets two conditions: when its norma-
tive nucleus is considered appropriate for the times; and 
when the gap between political promises and perfor-
mance is slight (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 423; Skow-
ronek, 1993). Leaders’ reputations are most effective 
when their personal biography, political philosophy 
and in-office decisions are widely perceived to align. 
Analysing political leadership through the prism of 
leadership capital assumes that it is the interaction be-
tween an individual’s personal capabilities and their in-
stitutional and situational environment that deter-
mines a leader’s ability to act. Prime ministers, 
however powerful, are dependent on institutional 
structures and on the wider context in which they op-
erate (Heffernan, 2003, p. 368). Although all leaders 
must work within constraints, some possess personali-
ties more disposed to challenging these constraints 
than others (Herrmann, 1988; Keller, 2005). The man-
ner in which different prime ministers approach similar 
situations varies significantly depending on their indi-
vidual character, as Anthony King observes: 
“Different people bring different personalities to the 
job; they have different goals; they adopt different 
styles; and they find themselves operating in different 
political environments. Second, there is variety within 
the lifetime of a single premiership.” (1991, p. 42) 
There can be no doubt that Junichiro Koizumi’s crusad-
er style of leadership varied wildly from Yasuo Fukuda’s 
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more managerial approach. Nor can it be denied that 
Shinzo Abe’s governing style was more dominant at the 
start of his second premiership than during his first. 
What is more difficult to discern is the extent to which 
policy and other political outcomes are determined by 
individual capabilities (oratory, charisma, negotiation) 
versus context. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda had lit-
tle choice but to take a conciliatory approach to work-
ing with Japan’s powerful bureaucracy and the divided 
factions within his own party, given the backdrop to his 
premiership—a lack of personal mandate, the ongoing 
nuclear crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant and eco-
nomic stagnation. But Noda’s conciliatory approach may 
also have been the case in any context. In his speech to 
the party caucus that made him prime minister, Noda 
described himself as more of a loach—a type of bottom 
feeding fish—than a ‘goldfish in a scarlet robe’ (Hayashi, 
2011). Noda’s self-description suggests he was a concili-
ator by nature and not just owing to circumstance.  
Robert Elgie (1995) offers an interactionist model 
for the study of political leadership, combining person-
al and systemic elements. His approach, designed for 
comparative analysis of leadership across liberal democ-
racies, supposes that ‘political leaders operate within an 
environment which will both structure their behaviour 
and constrain their freedom of action’ (1995, p. 8). Elgie 
supposes that leaders possess agency—the capacity to 
act independently—allowing them to shape the envi-
ronment in which they operate, if only up to a point, to 
improve their chances of success. The LCI similarly un-
derstands political authority as the product of a leader’s 
perceived skills and the environment in which they op-
erate. Capital accumulated or spent in one area has an 
impact on other elements of leadership capital.  
4. The Leadership Capital Index (LCI) 
The LCI is a diagnostic checklist for analysing a leader’s 
stock of authority, designed to identify variations in the 
aggregate level of leadership capital (Bennister et al., 
2015, p. 423). In this study, the LCI is applied compara-
tively to nine Japanese prime ministers to create a 
leadership league table (Table 3). It is used to provide a 
snapshot of the political authority of each leader at the 
mid-point of their premiership. Ideally, snapshots would 
be taken at various intervals during each leader’s tenure, 
as authority tends to ebb and flow over time (Breslauer, 
2002, p. 13; Bynander & Hart, 2006). Looking at only one 
moment in a leader’s tenure could potentially create a 
biased picture. But for the nine leaders analysed here, 
selection bias is limited by the short tenure of most sub-
jects. Seven of the nine leaders were prime minister for 
less than 15-months. To mitigate bias, for the longest 
serving leader, Junichiro Koizumi, three snapshots are 
analysed, at the start, middle and end of his five-and-a-
half-year premiership (Table 5). 
The LCI assesses leadership capital as an aggregate 
of skills, relations and reputation and has the potential 
to provide a more nuanced picture of a leader’s au-
thority than approval ratings or other quantitative data 
alone (Table 1). The variables included relate to the 
three elements of leadership capital defined above. 
Many indicators relate to perceptions and are meas-
ured using a mixture of ‘hard’ empirical data (public 
opinion polling, election results) and ‘soft’ interpretive 
assessments (expert panels, political biographies, me-
dia reports). This follows the approach used by Bennis-
ter et al. in their original article and is in line with an 
emerging mixed methods paradigm (Bennister et al., 
2015, p. 245; Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; 
Hesse-Biber & Burke Johnson, 2013, 2015). The sources 
of LCI measurement are outlined in Table 2. 
I have operationalised the Index using nine of the 
ten criteria suggested by Bennister et al. (2015, p. 424). 
The indicators included in the original LCI, ‘chosen by a 
process of reduction, distilling a vast array of variables 
often used to access political leadership down to a 
manageable number of 10’, are appropriate for as-
sessing leadership in any parliamentary democracy, in-
cluding Japan (Bennister et al., 2015, p.425). To better fit 
the context of Japanese politics, however, I have re-
placed one indicator—that measuring public trust in a 
leader—with a measure of perceived relations between 
the leader and the Japanese bureaucracy. I have made 
this change for two reasons. First, in Japan, public opin-
ion data on trust in politicians is not collected separately 
from personal approval ratings. As personal ratings poll-
ing data is used to measure public perceptions of a lead-
er’s skill (S2), it would not be appropriate to use this da-
ta a second time to populate another indicator.  
Second, relations with the bureaucracy are an im-
portant factor determining Japanese prime ministers’ 
ability to exercise authority. In most parliamentary 
democracies, governments operate under the conven-
tion of ministerial responsibility. Ministers take respon-
sibility for the activities of their departments based on 
the notion that authority rests with elected politicians. 
Public servants follow ministers’ instruction and are ac-
countable to them. Ministers in turn answer to parlia-
ment and the public for everything that happens within 
their departments. In Japan, bureaucrats do not regard 
themselves as accountable to their ministers and there 
are few mechanisms through which to enforce ac-
countability. Rather, Japanese bureaucrats largely con-
sider themselves an independent source of political au-
thority (George Mulgan, 2000, p. 187). Bureaucrats 
often have their own agendas and do not, as a matter 
of course, follow the instructions of ministers. Unlike in 
other parliamentary democracies, where publically de-
fending policy is the duty of the minister, Japanese bu-
reaucrats openly advocate particular policy positions, 
sometimes those contrary to their minister’s position. 
Bureaucrats can even answer questions on the floor of 
the Japanese parliament in place of ministers. 
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Table 1. Leadership capital index of a Japanese prime minister. 
Criteria Indicator Measurement (score of 1 low to 5 high) 
S1 01 Political/policy vision (1) Completely absent 
(2) Unclear/inconsistent 
(3) Moderately clear/consistent  
(4) Clear/consistent  
(5) Very clear  
S1 02 Communication skills (1) Very poor  
(2) Poor  
(3) Average  
(4) Good  
(5) Very good  
S2 03 Personal poll rating (1) Very low (< 20%) 
(2) Low (20-34%)  
(3) Moderate (35-49%)  
(4) High (50-64%)  
(5) Very high (> 65%)  
S2 04 Longevity (time in office) (1) <1 year  
(2) 1-2 years  
(3) 2-3 years  
(4) 3-4 years  
(5) >4 years  
S2 05 (Re)election as party leader (margin) (1) Very small (<1% of electors) (1) 
(2) Small (1-5%)  
(3) Moderate (5-10%)  
(4) Large (10-15%)  
(5) Very large (>15%)  
R1 06 Party polling relative to most recent 
election result 
(1) < -10% (1) 
(2) -10 to -2.5% (2) 
(3) -2.5% to 2.5% (3) 
(4) 2.5 to 10% (4) 
(5) >10% (5) 
R1 07 Likely serious challenge at next party 
presidential election 
(1) Very high  
(2) High  
(3) Moderate  
(4) Low  
(5) Very low  
R1 08 Working relations with the bureaucracy (1) Very poor  
(2) Poor  
(3) Average  
(4) Good  
(5) Very good 
R2 09 Perceived ability to shape party policy 
platform 
(1) Very low  
(2) Low  
(3) Moderate  
(4) High  
(5) Very high 
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness (1) Very low  
(2) Low  
(3) Moderate  
(4) High  
(5) Very high 
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Table 2. Source of LCI measurement. 
Criteria Indicator  Measure 
S1  01 Political/policy vision Soft (expert) 
S1  02 Communication skills Soft (expert) 
S2  03 Personal poll rating Hard (polling) 
S2  04 Longevity (time in office) Hard (chronology) 
S2  05 (Re)election as party leader (margin) Hard (vote count) 
R1  06 Party polling relative to most recent election result Hard (polling) 
R1  07 Likely serious challenge at next presidential election Soft (expert) 
R1  08 Working relations with the bureaucracy Soft (expert) 
R2  08 Perceived ability to shape party policy platform Soft (expert) 
R2  09 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness Soft (expert) 
Table 3. LCI measure of Japanese prime ministers 2000–2015. 
 Mori Koizumi Abe 1 Fukuda Aso Hatoyama Kan Noda Abe 2i 
S1 01 Political/policy vision 1 4 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 
S1 02 Communication skills 1 5 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 
S2 03 Personal poll ratingii 2 4 3 3 2 4 2 2 4 
S2 04 Longevity (time in office) 2 5 1 2 1 1 2 2 4 
S2 05 (Re)election as party 
leader (margin) 
NA (2)iii 5iv 5 5 5 4 5 4 4v 
R1 06 Party polling relative to 
most recent election resultvi 
2 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 
R1 07 Likely serious challenge at 
next presidential election 
1 5 2 2 1 2 1 2 5 
R1 08 Working relations with 
the bureaucracy 
3 4 3 4 3 2 2 3 4 
R2 09 Perceived ability to shape 
party policy platform 
1 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary 
effectiveness 
1 4 2 2 1 1 1 2 4 
Total score 16 42 25 27 20 20 21 22 38 
Notes: i Abe was the incumbent prime minister at the time of writing. Analysis of his second premiership is up to and in-
cluding December 2015; ii Monthly personal poll ratings are given as average for each premiership (see Appendix); iii Mori 
was elected party leader unopposed in a emergency ballot after Prime Minister Obuchi died following a stroke. Mori’s to-
tal score has been adjusted based on average score for the other nine indicators; iv Koizumi first won election as LDP presi-
dent in April 2001. He was re-elected unopposed in August 2001. He won a third clear victory against three challengers in 
September 2003; v In 2012, Abe lost the first round presidential ballot in which both party chapters and parliamentary rep-
resentatives could vote to Shigeru Ishiba. He won the second round run-off ballot in which only parliamentarians can vote 
by 54.8 per cent to Ishiba’s 45.2 per cent. Abe was re-elected as party president unopposed in September 2015. The score 
given here averages his performance over these two presidential elections (Abe would receive a score of 3 in 2012 and 5 in 
2015); vi In Japan both the upper and lower houses of parliament are elected in national elections. Upper house elections 
take place every three years, with half the seats up for election each time. Lower house elections take place at least every 
four years, with the prime minister having the power to dissolve parliament. Japanese elections use a mixed electoral system, 
with both single member districts (SMD) and a PR ballot. Election results used here combine both SMD and PR ballots. 
In addition to including bureaucratic relations, I have 
made one other partial change to the LCI offered by 
Bennister et al.. In their original, to measure public 
perceptions of a leader’s skill (S2), the leader’s current 
personal poll ratings are presented relative to that 
leader’s ratings at the most recent election (Bennister 
et al., 2015, p. 424). In Japan, very few prime ministers 
come to office at a general election. In fact just five of 
the 32 prime ministers that have served under the 
1947 post-war constitution came to office this way. 
Among the nine prime ministers studied here, just 
two—Yukio Hatoyama and Shinzo Abe—took office as 
the result of a general election (see Appendix).2 The 
other seven all came to power part way through par-
                                                          
2 Junichiro Koizumi came to power in April 2001 after the res-
ignation of Yoshiro Mori, but subsequently won the 2003 and 
2005 general elections. 
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liament after their predecessor resigned. In the Japa-
nese case, comparing a prime minister’s personal rat-
ings to those at the last election is inappropriate, as in 
the majority of cases a different leader was in office at 
that time. To capture public perceptions of a leader’s 
skills, I use personal approval polling data without 
comparison to ratings at the last election (Table 2). 
5. Applying the LCI: Japan’s Prime Ministers  
2000–2015 
The following analysis uses the LCI to answer the two 
research questions posed in the introduction to this ar-
ticle. Analysis is based on hard data combined with in-
sights from biography, media reports and my personal 
interviews with Tokyo-based politicians, political advi-
sors and journalists.  
5.1. Explaining Short Tenure 
Among the nine prime ministers analysed here, seven 
served less than 15-months in office (Table 3). Applying 
the LCI reveals that the leadership of short-serving 
prime ministers has several features in common. All 
suffered from a lack of policy vision and an inability to 
shape their party’s platform that severely limited their 
authority. In each case, these leaders failed to offer ei-
ther transformational or transactional leadership. They 
were neither able to gather capital through mobilising 
ideals and aspirations, nor by ‘delivering the goods’.  
In most cases, weak communication skills exacer-
bated leaders’ inability to offer a coherent personal 
and policy narrative. Although all seven prime minis-
ters came to office with healthy personal approval rat-
ings, these quickly evaporated when they failed to ar-
ticulate a clear purpose in seeking power. Each saw his 
personal approval ratings drop by 30 per cent or more 
between the start and end of his premiership (Figure 2). 
Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori ended his premiership 
with approval ratings of single digits and is the lowest 
scoring leader on the LCI (Table 3). Among the leaders 
studied here, Mori is a special case, coming to office af-
ter sitting Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi suffered a 
stroke. As LDP general secretary, Mori was elected 
prime minister unopposed in an emergency vote. He is 
mainly remembered for his gaffes, scandals and undip-
lomatic comments. Even before becoming prime minis-
ter, Mori was described in the Japanese media of hav-
ing ‘the heart of a flea and the brain of a shark’ (BBC, 
2000). Without Obuchi’s sudden death, Mori would not 
have become prime minister, which helps explain his 
exceptionally low LCI score. 
LDP Prime Ministers Abe (in his first term), Fukuda 
and Aso were undone by divisions within their party as 
well as by their personal leadership deficiencies. Policy 
ruptures related to vested interests within the LDP 
hampered efforts to tackle Japan’s stagnant economy, 
the top priority of Japanese voters (Mishima, 2012, p. 
278). All three leaders lacked the party management 
skills and direct popular support to overcome obstacles 
to economic reforms erected by members of their own 
party. Abe appointed his personal friends to key posi-
tions within the cabinet and bureaucracy, but failed to 
control them when bitter infighting occurred. Fukuda’s 
technocratic nature often left him as a bystander in 
policy debates. Aso’s tenancy to make flippant remarks 
and privileged personal background made him look out 
of touch. 
 
Figure 2. Prime minister’s personal approval rating by month in office (%). Source: NHK (2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/index.html 
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Ko Mishima (2012) notes structural reasons for the 
dearth of leadership ability at the top of the LDP in the 
2000s, citing the disappearance of the traditional ca-
reer path to the premiership. In its earlier days, promo-
tion within the LDP was based on seniority, allowing 
politicians to systematically build the knowledge and 
skills necessary for policy-making (Mishima, 2012, p. 
281). Politicians had to prove themselves able before 
reaching the cabinet. Furthermore, when intraparty fac-
tions controlled leadership selection, only those with 
good brokering skills could win the LDP presidency. As 
factional power has declined within the party since the 
1990s, those without leadership skills and training can 
rise to the top. Abe and Fukuda came to the premiership 
after relatively short careers compared to their prede-
cessors. Aso had a longer career, but his experience was 
narrower than that of most past prime ministers. Abe, 
Fukuda and Aso are all descendants of previous prime 
ministers, providing them with the networks to win the 
LDP presidency despite their leadership deficiencies.  
The decline of faction-based leader selection has al-
so left prime ministers more vulnerable in the face of 
declining personal approval ratings. Loyalties within 
the LDP and DPJ are now more fluid, leading party rep-
resentatives to abandon a prime minister with falling 
public support. In the past, a prime minister was secure 
in office even if he lost public confidence, as long as he 
maintained his factional coalition (Matsumoto, 2001). 
Today, parliamentarians are more concerned with the 
reputation of their party leader than in the past, as 
since electoral reforms in 1994 introduced PR ballots 
and SMDs, voters focus more on the image of national 
parties than on the personal traits of their local candi-
dates (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). The personal popu-
larity of the national leader plays an important role in 
creating the party’s public image.  
Fixed term elections for the party presidency en-
courage challenges to an unpopular prime minister 
among his intraparty rivals (Takayasu, 2010).3 Prime 
ministers often choose to jump before they are 
pushed, resigning rather than facing a leadership chal-
lenge they may not survive. Assuming office outside of 
the election cycle deprived most of the prime ministers 
studied here of a popular mandate, further weakening 
their authority and position vis-à-vis intraparty rivals. 
An exception is Yukio Hatoyama, who led the DPJ to 
election victory in August 2009, becoming head of the 
first single-party non-LDP government since 1955.  
Despite his electoral mandate, Hatoyama served 
just 256 days in office, the shortest tenure of any prime 
minister included in this study (see Appendix). Hato-
yama propensity for making rash policy pronouncement 
                                                          
3 The LDP holds presidential elections every three years (every 
two years until 2002). The DPJ held presidential elections every 
two years until 2011, but extended the presidential term to 
three years in 2012. 
on television, without the political skills to realise them, 
proved his undoing. In particular, his u-turn on a promise 
to relocate the U.S. Futenma marine military base out-
side Okinawa cost him public, press and party support. 
Hatoyama played an important role in launching the DPJ 
in 1996, largely owing to a personal fortune inherited 
from his mother. It was his financial rather than leader-
ship capital that propelled him to the party leadership. 
The DPJ made most of its political gains under Hatoya-
ma’s predecessor Ichiro Ozawa, who was forced to re-
sign the leadership following a financial scandal just 
three months prior to the 2009 general election. Hato-
yama was elected leader with Ozawa’s backing.  
Like their immediate LDP predecessors—Abe, Fuku-
da and Aso—the DPJ’s three prime ministers—
Hatoyama, Kan and Noda—largely failed due to their in-
ability to offer a convincing plan for economic recovery. 
The DPJ initially talked of implementing a social demo-
cratic style ‘Third Way’ (Daisan no Michi) between tradi-
tional LDP state-guided capitalism and neoliberalism, but 
quickly fell back on the latter. The three DPJ prime min-
isters also lost public confidence by failing to implement 
many of the new spending programmes listed in the par-
ty’s 2009 manifesto due to a lack of funds. Hatoyama 
and Kan were hampered in their efforts to find addition-
al money by non-cooperation from the bureaucracy. 
Even prior to taking office, Hatoyama caused friction 
with officials by naming curtailment of bureaucratic 
power as his top priority. Ministerial-led decision-making 
exacerbated existing policy and personality divisions 
among ministers and the wider parliamentary party.  
Although the DPJ does not possess formal factions 
like the LDP, informal groups of parliamentarians gath-
er around potential party leaders. But these groupings 
hold limited power over their members and are only 
one factor influencing the outcome of party leadership 
elections (Schmidt, 2011). Hatoyama, Kan and Noda 
were not backed by a stable alliance of groups. Like 
their LDP counterparts, their support among parlia-
mentary colleagues was predicated on their public 
popularity. Kan, for example, was elected to replace 
Hatoyama in June 2010 following media reports that 
he was voters’ preferred choice (Mishima, 2012, p. 
290). Kan’s stance as the anti-Ozawa candidate was 
another factor in his success. Admired and reviled in 
equal measure, Ichiro Ozawa, known as the ‘shadow 
shogun’ for his skill in backroom dealing, was a source 
of party division for all three DPJ prime ministers 
(George Mulgan, 2015). Ozawa’s leadership challenge 
to Kan three months after the latter took the helm cre-
ated a fatal schism within the party (Rebuild Japan Ini-
tiative Foundation, 2013).  
Beating Ozawa initially gave Kan new buoyancy in 
the opinion polls (Figure 2). But Kan quickly squan-
dered his new mandate as DPJ president by mishan-
dling tensions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Is-
lands following a skirmish between a Japanese Coast 
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Guard vessel and a Chinese fishing trawler on 7 Sep-
tember 2010. Beset by scandals and misjudgements, 
Kan seemed to be already on his way out of office 
when the Great Tohoku Earthquake and resulting Fu-
kushima nuclear disaster struck on 11 March 2011. If 
managed effectively, crises can boost a leader’s reputa-
tion. In times of crisis, people look to their leaders to 
‘do something’. Successful crisis management can turn 
mere politicians into statesmen. But when a crisis is 
mismanaged, their visibility makes leaders the obvious 
scapegoat (Boin & ’t Hart, 2003, p. 544). To turn a crisis 
into an opportunity, leaders must shape the way a cri-
sis is perceived and present convincing plans to man-
age its ramifications (Foley, 2009, p. 502). 
When confronted by crisis, Naoto Kan struggled to 
provide a reassuring response. His difficulties in man-
aging the Fukushima disaster became bound up with 
pre-existing doubts over his capacity for leadership. 
Under the glare of media focus, Kan’s infamous temper 
and tendency to micromanage unnecessary details be-
came a source of public criticism. His preference for re-
lying on a small inner circle of personal advisors 
strained his working relations with the bureaucracy, 
delaying the emergency response on the ground (Na-
tional Diet of Japan, 2012). Opinion polls in the months 
following the disaster showed two-thirds of voters were 
disappointed with the Kan’s handling of the Fukushima 
crisis (The Economist, 2011a). Thus when Ozawa again 
tried to unseat Kan by conspiring with the LDP to pass a 
non-confidence vote in the lower house, the prime min-
ister had no option but to resign to forestall the vote. 
Taking power following Kan’s resignation in August 
2011, the DPJ’s final prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda at-
tempted to overcome party divisions by using seniority 
rather than political affiliation to appoint his cabinet. 
But despite his considerable skill at building consensus, 
Noda was not able to hold his party together. The DPJ 
had become, in the words of Diet member Akihisa Na-
gashima, ‘like Afghanistan’: an ungovernable collection 
of tribes revolving around loyalty to a few chieftains ra-
ther than to a common ideology (The Economist, 
2011b). Noda faced opposition from Ozawa and Hato-
yama’s supporters on tax increases, social benefits re-
form, and Trans-Pacific free trade. But he proved will-
ing and able to build alliances within the bureaucracy 
and opposition parties to bypass his intraparty oppo-
nents. In June 2012 Noda successfully brokered a tri-
partite agreement with the opposition LDP and New 
Komeito to raise consumption tax from 2014.  
Passage of the consumption tax bill, however, came 
at a high price for the prime minister. Interpreting 
Noda’s bill as an attempt to move the DPJ to the right, 
50 left-leaning parliamentarians resigned the party 
whip (The Economist, 2012). Although in recognition of 
his tactical victory and tenacity, Noda’s approval rating 
initially rose after passage of the consumption tax bill, 
his popularity soon declined as his party began to im-
plode (Inoguchi, 2013, p. 188). Smelling blood, the LDP 
withdrew their cooperation with Noda, redoubling their 
efforts to force a general election (The Economist, 2012). 
Unlike the other short-tenured prime ministers 
studied here, Noda was more the victim of circum-
stance than of his own failings. By any measure, Noda 
came to power in difficult circumstances, inheriting es-
calating territorial tensions with China, a faltering 
economy and a cumulative annual government debt 
that had reached 200 per cent of GDP. The March 2011 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, compound-
ed Japan’s economic quagmire. Public disappointment 
with his DPJ predecessors also weighed heavily on 
Noda. Throughout his premiership, the DPJ lacked a 
majority in the House of Councillors, which was lost at 
the July 2010 election. To pass legislation aimed at 
speeding recovery from the 2011 disasters and tackling 
the deficit, Noda required support from the opposition 
LDP and New Komeito. But with public support for the 
DPJ languished at around 20 per cent, he lacked the rela-
tional capital to bring the opposition to the negotiating 
table. LDP leaders were reluctant to reach legislative 
deals with Noda that could forestall the calling of a gen-
eral election, which the LDP was confident it would win. 
The DPJ’s unpopularity further led to a spate of defec-
tions by its own parliamentarians. By mid-November 
2012, Noda had lost his majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives, forcing him to call a general election. 
5.2. Explaining Long Tenure 
Since 2000, only two Japanese prime ministers have 
served more than two years in office (Table 3). Junichi-
ro Koizumi was prime minister for five-and-a-half years 
from April 2001, finally resigning in September 2006 
owing to party imposed term-limits, despite retaining 
high public approval (Figure 3). At the time of writing, 
Shinzo Abe was entering the third year of his second 
non-consecutive term as prime minister. Re-elected to 
the premiership at the December 2012 general election, 
Abe was previously prime minister for one year follow-
ing Koizumi’s resignation in September 2006. Articula-
tion of a clear policy vision and a related personal narra-
tive are at the heart of both leaders’ success (Table 3). 
Junichiro Koizumi won the LDP presidency on his 
third attempt in April 2001, only after a huge popular 
vote from grassroots members forced the hands of party 
bosses (Stockwin, 2008, p. 105). Koizumi used his mas-
tery of television and the popular press to appeal to his 
party’s rank and file above the heads of LDP elders who 
abhorred his radical neoliberal agenda. He went on to 
win three national elections by appealing directly to the 
electorate with the campaign slogan ‘Change the LDP, 
Change Japan’. Koizumi’s share of the vote actually 
strengthened over the course of his time in office (Table 
4). His long hair and natural charisma were refreshing in 
a political system characterised by convention. 
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Figure 3. Prime minister Koizumi’s personal approval ratings April 2001–September 2006 (%). Source: NHK (2015). Re-
trieved from http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/index.html 
Table 4. General election results 2003 and 2005. 
 2003 2005 
 SDM Seats PR Seats SDM Seats PR Seats 
Liberal Democratic Party 168 69 219 77 
Democratic Party of Japan 105 72 52 61 
New Komeito 9 25 8 23 
Communist Party 0 9 0 9 
Social Democratic Party 1 5 1 6 
Source: Election Resources (2015). Retrieved from http://www.electionresources.org/jp 
By Japanese standards, Koizumi’s domestic agenda was 
radical. Cabinet posts were to be allocated on merit 
and no longer by faction. Spending on public works was 
to be slashed, and government borrowing capped. 
Banks would have to acknowledge the full extent of 
their bad loans and then sort them out to get the 
economy moving again. Above all, Koizumi planned to 
privatise the Japanese postal service, which lay at the 
heart of the parasitic relationship between Japan’s pol-
iticians, bureaucrats and interest groups. 
Shinzo Abe’s first premiership was marred by his 
indecision on economic reform and by poor party 
management that led to a series of scandals involving 
his senior ministers. Ultimately, Abe’s leadership was 
dealt a fatal blow by the LDP’s defeat in the House of 
Councillors election in July 2007. Six weeks later, Abe 
announced his resignation. But in September 2012, a 
combination of his own actions, the right circumstanc-
es and a bit of luck allowed Abe to regain his party’s 
leadership (Burrett, forthcoming). Poor health was the 
official reason given for his 2007 resignation. In staging 
his comeback, Abe’s PR team used his recovery to build 
a narrative of personal drive and discipline in the face 
of adversity.4 To prove his newfound vitality, once re-
elected LDP president, Abe hit the ground running with 
a clear set of policy aims. Abe’s first premiership had 
lacked policy focus, but Abe 2.0 made ‘Abenomics’—
his plan to revive the economy through fiscal stimulus, 
                                                          
4 Author’s interview with Japan Times journalist, June 2014. 
monetary easing and structural reforms—his pro-
gramme showpiece. In focusing on the economy and 
promising neo-liberal structural reforms, Abe bor-
rowed from the Koizumi playbook. Supported by a 
much-improved PR operation that includes Koizumi’s 
image guru Isao Iijima, Abe and his economic plan be-
came ever-present on Japanese TV screens. His insist-
ence that a reluctant Bank of Japan reverse deflation 
with significant quantitative easing, contrasted posi-
tively with the incumbent DPJ government’s muddled 
economic strategy.  
Abe’s bold and theatrical behaviour drew lessons 
from Koizumi’s leadership. In 2005, Koizumi dramati-
cally withdrew the whip from 37 LDP parliamentarians 
opposed to his privatisation of Japan Post before call-
ing a general election in which he ran his own hand-
picked candidates against his former colleagues (Mi-
shima, 2007, p. 734). Koizumi, whose popularity and 
political authority had been waning prior to the elec-
tion, was rewarded with a landslide (Figure 3). But Koi-
zumi’s victory was less the result of public enthusiasm 
for privatisation than of support for his strong and de-
cisive leadership. Likewise, Abe’s comeback and second 
term popularity owed more to voters’ approval of his 
bold advocacy of Abenomics than to support for the 
specifics of his plan. 
Concentrating his efforts on reviving the Japanese 
economy allowed Abe to win back a majority for his 
government in upper house elections in July 2013. For 
Abe, this was a personal victory, as it had been on his 
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watch in 2007 that the DPJ had replaced the LDP as the 
largest party in the House of Councillors. But despite 
impressive gains in the July 2013 elections, in the up-
per house Abe still relies on coalition partners, New 
Komeito, for his majority. Koizumi also governed in co-
alition with Komeito throughout his premiership.5 But 
in neither case was coalition a major constraint on the 
prime minister. Associated with the Buddhist sect Soka 
Gakkai, Komeito is a pacifist party relying predominant-
ly on the religious faithful for its votes. Yet, despite its 
pacifist leanings, Komeito remained in government 
with Abe after his reinterpretation of Japan’s peace 
constitution to allow for collective self-defence (Bur-
rett, forthcoming).6 Similarly, Komeito continued in co-
alition with Koizumi despite his decision to introduce 
legislation allowing the Self-Defence Forces (Japan’s 
military) to be deployed to Iraq in 2003. In both cases, 
defence reforms were controversial with the Japanese 
public (Ishibashi, 2007; Yoshida, 2014). But Koizumi 
and Abe were able to maintain their coalitions owing to 
their broader electoral appeal. Throughout their prem-
ierships, both were personally more popular than their 
party, minimising the chances of a serious leadership 
challenge or backbench rebellion by government MPs.  
The examples of Abe and Koizumi show how if 
                                                          
5 Koizumi inherited a coalition government in April 2001. He 
failed to turn his 60 per cent approval rating into a majority for 
his party in the November 2003 general election and continued 
to rely on coalition partners. Koizumi finally won a majority for 
his party in the lower house in the September 2005 general 
election, but continued to rely on New Komeito for a majority 
in the upper house. 
6 Article 9 of Japan’s constitution bars it from using force to re-
solve conflicts except in the case of self-defence. In July 2014, 
the Abe cabinet reinterpreted the constitution to henceforth 
allow Japan to fight overseas to aide its allies. 
spent wisely, leadership capital in one area provides 
dividends in others. Personal popularity allowed both 
leaders to challenge the policy status quo within the 
LDP. Their bold actions reinforced public perceptions of 
their leadership as decisive, giving them a stronger 
hand in dealing with intraparty dissent. Koizumi in par-
ticular faced strong opposition from within LDP ranks 
as he attempted to dismantle patronage and pork bar-
rel networks that had maintained the party’s power, 
but constrained its policies, for decades. Koizumi, how-
ever, managed to turn this opposition to his advantage. 
His war against post office privatisation rebels sealed 
his reputation as the slayer of vested interests, allow-
ing him to leave office at the height of his authority, 
contrary to the downward trajectory of most premier-
ships (Laing & ’t Hart, 2011).  
Although Koizumi left office on a high note, did he 
leave a lasting legacy? Did he exercise leadership or 
merely hold office? Few leaders achieve as much as 
they hope or promise. Although evaluations of Koizu-
mi’s premiership are generally favourable, there are 
reasons to question the extent of his accomplishments 
and the endurance of his legacy (Anderson, 2004; 
Shimizu, 2005). This conclusion does not suggest that 
there were not significant achievements. Koizumi left 
office undefeated at the polls, with strong economic 
performance underpinning his general election victo-
ries. He also energised Japan’s dealings with the world, 
albeit controversially in his support for the U.S.-led 
‘War on Terror’. Domestically, Koizumi introduced sub-
stantial reforms to the state apparatus, which ultimate-
ly strengthened his authority over parliament and his 
own party (Table 5). But facing stiff opposition from 
within the LDP, Koizumi delayed in embarking on his 
personal reform agenda until late in his premiership, 
curtailing his domestic legacy.  
Table 5. LCI measure of Junichiro Koizumi over time (2001–2006). 
 K1 
May 2001 
K2 
Jan 2004 
K3 
Sept 2006 
S1 01 Political/policy vision 4 4 5 
S1 02 Communication skills 5 5 5 
S2 03 Personal poll rating 5 4 4 
S2 04 Longevity (time in office) 1 4 5 
S2 05 (Re)election as party leader (margin) 5 5 5 
R1 06 Party polling relative to most recent election result 2 2 2 
R1 07 Likely serious challenge at next presidential election 5 5 5 
R1 08 Working relations with the bureaucracy 4 4 4 
R2 08 Perceived ability to shape party policy platform 3 2 4 
R2 09 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness 3 3 4 
Total score 37 38 43 
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Stubbornly resisted by his own party, Koizumi’s re-
forms were all partial and much delayed. In the face of 
opposition, bold proposals were diluted. Rather than 
the savings and insurance functions of Japan Post being 
abolished, they would continue as separate organisa-
tions, and privatisation would be delayed to 2017 (The 
Economist, 2006b). But Koizumi began the break up of 
Japan’s ‘iron triangle’—big business, the bureaucracy 
and the LDP—making government a bit more account-
able and efficient. In expelling 37 parliamentary rebels 
who voted against privatisation, and putting up allies 
to run against them in a snap election in 2005, Koizumi 
destroyed the old LDP.  
Koizumi’s achievements in foreign policy were also 
partial. Koizumi moved to ‘normalise’ Japan’s foreign 
and security policy. Challenging the limits placed on Ja-
pan by its post-war pacifist constitution, he sent refuel-
ling tankers to the Indian Ocean and peacekeeping 
troops to Iraq (Ishibashi, 2007). He worked with the 
U.S. to make Japan less dependent on America’s mili-
tary umbrella and shoulder more of the burden of its 
own defence, but stopped short of amending the con-
stitution to assert Japan’s right to participate in collec-
tive security (Pekkanen & Krauss, 2005). Despite his 
foreign and security policy successes, Koizumi marred 
his international reputation by visiting Tokyo’s Yasuku-
ni Shrine, which commemorates 14 war criminals along 
with millions of Japanese war dead (Hiwatari, 2005). 
His actions not only damaged relations with key trading 
partners China and South Korea, but also made territo-
rial disputes harder to settle, and hardened opposition 
to Japan’s attempt to gain a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council (The Economist, 2006a). In short, Koi-
zumi’s Yasukuni visits undermined his ambition to 
make Japan more ‘normal’—i.e. ensuring a presence in 
international political affairs equal to its economic sta-
tus. In December 2013, Abe’s visit as prime minister to 
the controversial shrine similarly poured cold water on 
already cool relations with neighbouring states occu-
pied by Japan in World War Two. 
External forces limit all prime ministers; in the case 
of Koizumi, a major constraint was hostility to his re-
form agenda from members of his own party. Koizumi 
used his personal popularity to outmanoeuvre his LDP 
opponents and trump the faction system that had 
hitherto controlled Japan’s prime ministers. He intro-
duced institutional reforms that changed the way au-
thority is accrued to the prime minister’s office. Thanks 
to these reforms, political advancement came to de-
pend more on loyalty to the prime minister than to fac-
tion. But battling his party ran down the clock on Koi-
zumi, constraining what he could achieve during his 
two-term-limit as LDP president.  
Koizumi did more than merely hold office. He may 
not have achieved as much lasting change as trans-
formative prime ministers like Shigeru Yoshida and 
Hayato Ikeda, but a number of his reforms live on. 
The economic policy of Japan’s current prime minis-
ter, Shinzo Abe, contains elements of Koizumi’s lais-
sez-faire approach, including a commitment to fur-
ther deregulation to promote growth. Abe has also 
carried forward Koizumi’s ambition to amend consti-
tutional restrictions on collective security. Perhaps 
most significantly, Koizumi’s powerful exercise of 
leadership changed the image of the prime minister in 
Japan. After Koizumi’s success, Japanese voters began 
to demand that the prime minister lead policymaking 
with more force. Some commentators predicted a 
new era of strong prime ministers (Machidori, 2006; 
Takenaka, 2006). But Koizumi’s immediate successors 
failed to live up to the expectations raised by his 
leadership. Koizumi proved a hard act to follow. His 
strong personal leadership hollowed out his party, 
leaving it in a state of disarray.  
Koizumi paid little attention to building structures 
within the LDP to allow his revolution to continue be-
yond his tenure as party president. He failed to build 
new policy groupings around his neoliberal agenda to 
replace the traditional LDP zoku (policy tribes) that his 
leadership undermined. A natural loner, he neglected 
to groom potential protégés to carry forward his re-
forms. Ultimately, Koizumi’s personal leadership 
traits—especially his willingness to take on vested in-
terests and challenge the status quo—proved more 
adept at destroying the old than creating the new. He 
lacked the bargaining skills to build new structures 
when confronted by opposition from other authorita-
tive actors.  
In his second term, Shinzo Abe has clearly learned 
from Koizumi’s mistakes, in particular by paying closer 
attention to party management than his predecessor. 
Abe has successfully remade the LDP in his own image, 
by selecting candidates sharing his right-wing ideology 
to contest the 2012 general election. The hundred-plus 
freshmen representatives who rode to power on Abe’s 
coattails in December 2012 have largely remained loyal 
to the prime minister. Unity within his parliamentary 
party has allowed Abe to pass controversial security 
and secrecy legislation at breakneck speed. In achiev-
ing constitutional and security reform, Abe has gone 
further, and faster, than Koizumi. 
Abe has also paid closer attention to political ap-
pointments than Koizumi, who by temperament tend-
ed to act as a lone wolf. During his first term, Abe 
staffed the prime minister’s office and cabinet with 
parliamentarians to whom he was personally close, giv-
ing them roles such as ‘Special Advisor to the Prime 
Minister’. But Abe’s friends proved poor lieutenants. 
Decision-making became bottled-necked, and bitter 
turf wars ensued, as Abe’s inner circle jealously guard-
ed their access to the prime minister (Burrett, forth-
coming). A dysfunctional chain of command contribut-
ed to Abe’s downfall. In his second term, Abe clearly 
demonstrated greater political skill in making appoint-
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ments than during his first premiership. For his second 
government, Abe was quick to choose Yoshihide Suga 
as his chief cabinet secretary. His appointment reflects 
Abe’s recognition of Suga’s political ability, rather than 
a personal connection between the two men. Abe 
made it clear that Suga was the gatekeeper to the 
Prime Minister’s Office. This made Abe’s second gov-
ernment much more effective in managing policy, par-
liament, and public relations, than his first administra-
tion. In comparison, Koizumi’s tendency for self-
reliance limited what he was able to achieve. 
Despite running a tighter ship second time around, 
Abe’s policy legacy to date is a mixed picture. Like Koi-
zumi before him, Abe has delayed in introducing eco-
nomic reforms opposed by vested interests within the 
LDP. Abe came to office promising massive structural 
reforms to boost economic growth. To his credit, Abe 
has tackled some of Japan’s most entrenched interest 
groups. Abe has broken the power of the agricultural 
cooperatives, bypassing their objections to sign the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal. The prime 
minister has also reformed corporate governance with 
unexpected speed and determination. But labour re-
form, desperately needed to raise productivity, re-
mains untouched (Harding & Lewis, 2015).  
Despite the fanfare, Abenomics has not revived Ja-
pan’s economy. The BoJ’s monetary expansion and as-
set purchases have pushed the value of the yen down 
to multi-year lows against the dollar and sparked a 
stock market rally that ran from just before Abe took 
office in late 2012 through most of 2015. But, the Jap-
anese economy has performed unevenly, falling into 
recession in mid-2014 and then swinging between 
quarters of growth and contraction in 2015. Rather 
than focusing on badly needed deregulation and struc-
tural reforms, Abe spent much of 2015 battling to pass 
unpopular security legislation. Although voters admire 
Abe for his strong convictions, few share his obsession 
with security reform, especially when it comes at the 
expense of the economy. As was the case with Koizumi 
before him, Abe’s nationalist principles are divisive 
both at home and abroad. But despite their failings, 
Koizumi and Abe are the contemporary Japanese prime 
ministers to whom all others are compared, and in 
most cases, found wanting. 
6. The LCI in the Japanese Context 
When applied to Japanese case studies, two problems 
arise with the LCI as it is operationalised here. First, bi-
ases in the electoral system that benefit larger par-
ties—in particular the LDP—complicate the use of poll-
ing data on party support relative to the most recent 
election result as an indicator of a prime minister’s re-
lations with the electorate as leader of his party (Table 
3, indicator 06). Disparities in population size between 
electoral districts, which in some cases is as extreme as 
four to one, benefits the LDP that tends to do well in 
smaller, rural constituencies (Kabashima & Steel, 2012; 
Reed, 2003). Electoral pacts and the fact that many 
smaller parties lack the means to field candidates in 
every district, leads to substantial tactical voting in 
SMD ballots. The impact of tactical voting is seen when 
comparing the vote share received by each party at the 
2014 general election in the SMD and PR ballots (Table 
6). When casting their PR ballot, voters are more likely 
to vote for their true preference, as proportional dis-
tribution means seats and votes correlate more closely 
than in the SMD ballot. For this reason, if applying the 
LCI to Japanese leaders in the future, scholars may pre-
fer to compare party polling relative to only the PR 
election results. 
Second, using party support data to gauge the 
prime minister’s relations with the public is further 
complicated by the fact that a party and its leader can 
have very different standing in the public mind. The 
LDP dominated government for many decades from 
1955, with voters returning the party to power 
whether or not its leader was personally popular. 
Partly, this was because policy was driven by the rul-
ing party and its allies in business and the bureaucra-
cy, rather than by the prime minister. Despite a per-
sonal approval rating of just 17 per cent, Prime 
Minister Mori was re-elected in the June 2000 general 
election, with the LDP receiving 41 per cent of SMD 
votes and 28 per cent in the PR ballot (Figure 2). Since 
Table 6. December 2014 general election results. 
 SMD PR 
 % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Liberal Democratic Party 48.1 222 33.1 68 
Democratic Party of Japan 22.5 38 18.3 35 
Japan Innovation Party  8.2 11 15.7 30 
New Komeito  1.4 9 13.7 26 
Japanese Communist Party  13.3 1 11.4 20 
Party for Future Generations  1.8 2 2.7 0 
Social Democratic Party  0.8 1 2.5 1 
People's Life Party  1.0 2 1.9 0 
Source: Election Resources (2015). Retrieved from http://www.electionresources.org/jp 
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Junichiro Koizumi’s dominant leadership changed pub-
lic expectations of the prime minister, the fortunes of 
party and leader have become more intertwined. Pub-
lic assessment of the prime minister and his party, 
however, continue to be somewhat separate. For most 
of his premiership Koizumi was considerably more 
popular than the LDP (NHK, 2015). Koizumi used this 
situation to his advantage, setting himself up in opposi-
tion to his own party, a tactic used successfully by 
Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair (Hennessy, 2001). 
Looking at Koizumi’s consistently low rating for party 
support on the LCI creates a misleading picture of his 
relationship with the electorate (Table 5). A similar 
problem is observed for Shinzo Abe, who was also 
more popular in his second term than his party (Table 
3) (NHK, 2015).  
For the LCI to better fit the Asian context more 
broadly, the dynastic nature of the region’s politics 
must be taken into consideration. Political families are 
a feature of politics in India, Thailand, Japan and sever-
al other Asian states. Among the nine Japanese leaders 
analysed in this article, four are either the sons or 
grandsons of former prime ministers. Thought must be 
given to how to operationalise the benefits conferred 
by family networks within the LCI. One-party domi-
nance is another feature of Japanese politics that is 
common across Asia. When one party dominates the 
political scene, LCI indices measuring inter-party sup-
port levels may be less important to leadership author-
ity than intra-party factional politics.  
7. Conclusion 
Applying the LCI to Japanese leaders reveals a lack of 
policy vision and an inability to communicate a clear 
purpose for seeking power as the underlying causes 
of short tenure in most cases. Prime ministers lacking 
the necessary skills to acquire and deploy leadership 
capital have become more likely to achieve office 
since changes to the Japanese electoral system in 
1994. Electoral reform precipitated the decline of fac-
tions within the LDP that had sustained a seniority-
based promotion system requiring potential leaders 
to hone their political skills in a variety of party posi-
tions before reaching the premiership. Electoral re-
form also eventually brought to power three prime 
ministers from the DPJ. LDP dominance for much of 
the post-war period deprived most DPJ politicians of 
more than fleeting ministerial experience. Outside of 
government, DPJ leaders were unable to develop the 
networks within the bureaucracy necessary to facili-
tate effective policy-making once in office. In most 
cases, poor leadership skills quickly translated into 
falling public popularity, with negative consequences 
for the prime ministers’ relational and reputational 
capital. Personal poll ratings of less than 25 per cent 
were a tipping point from which a leader was unable 
to return. Ironically, electoral reforms brought to of-
fice leaders with poorly developed skills at the same 
moment as party leadership became a more im-
portant factor in determining voter choice at elec-
tions.  
Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe (second term) 
managed to sustain power for substantially longer than 
their counterparts by articulating a coherent personal 
and policy narrative. Koizumi’s leadership capital was 
enhanced by his charisma and uncommon communica-
tion skills. Although Abe worked on his public speaking 
skills between his first and second governments, he 
remains a rather underwhelming performer. The lesson 
here is that the message is more important than the 
manner in which it is delivered. Koizumi and Abe both 
also benefited from factors not captured by the LCI. 
Abe took office after three years of unpopular DPJ rule. 
Since their election defeat in 2012, the DPJ has been 
riven with internal disputes (divisions that actually be-
gan before the party lost power and were a factor in its 
defeat), not least over controversial issues such as col-
lective self-defence. In the December 2014 general 
election, the DPJ won just 73 seats, a result only mar-
ginally better than when it lost power in 2012. Abe has 
been able to exploit the weakness of opposition parties 
to push controversial reforms such as the 2013 Secrecy 
Act and the reinterpretation of Article 9, policies that 
were unthinkable in the political context of his first 
premiership. Koizumi, in contrast, faced a surging op-
position, his attacks on his own party helping the DPJ 
to win new ground. But despite Koizumi’s criticism of 
his party, both leaders benefited from leading the LDP. 
Decades of incumbency affords the LDP special lever-
age over Japan’s bureaucracy and with smaller political 
parties. For the latter, coalition with the LDP offers the 
most assured route to office.  
Koizumi’s personal skills were a key factor in sus-
taining his leadership capital for so long. His dominant 
behaviour, however, was less suited to delivering last-
ing change. Abe’s reforms have also been partial. Alt-
hough he has announced hundreds of structural re-
form initiatives, few have been turned into tangible 
legislation (Kingston, 2014). Despite their difficulties in 
achieving their agenda, the conviction politics of Koi-
zumi and Abe undermine the dominant paradigm that 
strong leadership is the antitheses of Japanese cultural 
preferences for consensus and conformity. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Route to power and longevity in office. 
Prime Minister Days in Office Route to Power 
Mori 386 Internal Party Election 
Koizumi 1979 Internal Party Election  
Abe 1 365 Internal Party Election 
Fukuda 364 Internal Party Election 
Aso 357 Internal Party Election 
Hatoyama 256 General Election 
Kan 451 Internal Party Election 
Noda 481 Internal Party Election 
Abe 2 1070* General Election 
Note: * Until 31 December 2015. 
